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# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 46/81)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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EGYPT

INTERVIEW WITH 'UMAR AL-TALMASANI

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 241 25 Sep-1 Oct 81 pp 35-37

[Interview with 'Umar al-Talmasani by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: "Violence Will Not Scare Us and Leniency Will Not Deceive Us;" date and place not specified]

[Text] When Sadat's policy was about to clash with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, we went for a press interview with 'Umar al-Talmasani, the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the chief editor of the magazine AL-DAWAT which was confiscated. Today, the clash has taken place and al-Talmasani and his comrades are in prison as are thousands of political detainees and leaders of religious movements. The talk we had with him a few days before his imprisonment forms the first line of defense at the new Muslim Brotherhood's trial. This interview is also the third most important journalistic coup recorded with important Egyptian detainees and fugitives since Ahmed Parghali and Lutfi al-Khwali.

[Question] Let us start by defining the Muslim Brotherhood's position as a "force" among the opposition forces in Egypt. On what basis does this group build its opposition to President Sadat and his policies?

[Answer] Yes, we are in the opposition. Our opposition primarily focuses on the fact that the existing system had neglected to apply in this Muslim country God's laws "may he be glorified." For this reason our opposition is basically aimed at the system itself and not toward obtaining power by changing those who are in the government, or by replacing them. The Muslim Brotherhood do not aspire for governing per se, and do not care who is in power. But what simply and solely concerns them is the principles of governing. In our opposition, we adhere to the righteous and pure Islamic system, without defamation or accusation...without slander or seizing of opportunities...without abuse or suspicions. We are objective and we do not concern ourselves with individuals. Despite that, we know that this philosophy does not please the authorities and does not even please their opposition. But when did we take into consideration either one of them? We strive to please only God. We hope we are right.

What we really want, and that answers the second part of the question, is the Koran as the source of legislation. We are requesting that the constitution and the political parties be abolished. We are requesting the boycott of ideas that come to us from the West and from the communists, and which are alien to our

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religion. We are asking to resist and fight imperialism in every place. We are requesting holy war "Jihad" against Zionism. That is all we want and these are our requests.

Camp David is a True Evil

[Question] Every one of your points is radically different from Sadat's policies. Each point needs more clarification...what do you say about that?

[Answer] As for applying God's laws, "the Sharia" had talked about it. With regard to our stand concerning the parties in Egypt, we reject them because their platforms are situational. Each party has a platform that changes according to circumstances. In addition, these parties, in their struggle to get to power, aim for their own interests and for propagating their ideologies. They also restrict their activities to only worldly matters. Our stand against imperialism and Zionism is also very clear. It is enough that we opposed the peace treaty with Israel from the outset and we think it is a pure evil from every angle.

[Question] Then, you wholly agree that the Arab countries were right in boycotting the Egyptian system?

[Answer] Indeed they were right in their boycott. But I have to say that some Islamic countries erred in what was supposed to be done in handling the dangers of that treaty. After that step it was necessary for those countries to unite. If Egypt was thinking about obtaining stability through this treaty, Israel did not have this in mind. What she had in mind was the breaking of Muslim unity. Israel succeeded, and some of those countries helped her succeed. The Muslim countries are responsible for Israel's success. Should we help her too? If the Islamic countries reconcile, unite and agree among themselves, that will undoubtedly halt Israel and help Egypt to free itself from that treaty that helped Israel in hurting Muslims and in continuing its antagonisms.

[Question] How?

[Answer] Israel challenges us with uninhibited boldness. Look what Begin had said! He said that bombing the Iraqi nuclear plant was only the first step in order to strike at any development in any Islamic country. This means that he is not satisfied with protecting the "security of Israel" inside her borders, but he is boasting that he wants to strike at the heart of the Islamic countries... What did we do when we were faced with that impertinent bragging? Is it enough to be satisfied by the Security Council condemnation of Israel....Should a decision like that satisfy us?

The Syrian-Soviet Maneuvers

[Question] Then, how do you see the Arab situation now?

[Answer] I will talk to you about tangible and precise matters to explain this situation. A couple of days ago, the newspaper published that an Arab country sent a military delegation to the Soviet Union to conclude an arms transaction. What is the size of the army of that country, and what is their fighting capability? Who, in reality, is in charge of their technical military command?

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What is the confrontation capability of these purchased arms, and what is their usefulness? Does communism sympathize with believers and as a result give them the best of what it has or is it a way to circulate wealth "the billions" in the East once and then in the West at another time? Is it not to prevent their evil? But it will not be prevented. Is it not to get their approval? But that will not be gained. At the same time Russia derides Hafiz al-Asad by holding major maneuvers near Latakia. Do you know why these maneuvers took place? Were they to scare Israel? I wish they were. The reason for these maneuvers is to frighten the Syrian people.

Motto of the System

[Question] Let us talk again about the Muslim Brotherhood...and about what is going on in Egypt. What exactly happened to your magazine AL-DAWAT? Do you think that it will be published again?

[Answer] What happened is that, on 29 July, people from the Bureau of Investigation burst into the magazine office and confiscated papers. They also ordered some workers to leave and take with them their clothes so that they could go home. Then they closed the doors for about 6 hours and confiscated several copies of the last issue of August because they considered its contents offensive to President Sadat and his policies. In reality, we are surprised by what took place. Isn't that an abuse of the laws, freedom and constitution? Why was the National Egyptian press silent about this aggression? They are praising the system for what is committed against the dignity and freedom of the citizen. The vice-squad sees and hears what is shown on television and does nothing about it, even though what is shown is corrupting the morals of the youths... But the Ministry of Interior trembles at an article that is beneficial and does not corrupt or harm. AL-AHRAM had the temerity to publish a cartoon that is heretical and an assault on the constitution, and nobody in the government did anything about it. All people know who is behind that heresy. If government officials give it as much attention as they give in pursuing the Muslim Brotherhood by various means of spying and wiretapping, they would have spared this country the dangerous consequences that are steadily approaching. But it seems to me that the motto of the government toward the Muslim Brotherhood is "any danger compared to the Muslim Brotherhood is no danger."

We Will Not Resort to Court

[Question] What will be your reaction toward governmental actions? Will you resort to court?

[Answer] The Muslim Brotherhood exists with or without the magazine. Our call will continue to get to people by every mean. Will we resort to court? This will never happen...because God judges rightly between them and us. We will not blame anyone, because we do not have the right to place blame. We are sure that some of our officials demand a blind obedience...we refuse them what they want.

Let everyone know that we are not the kind of people who become soft under enticement, and we do not fear violence that frightens others...we believe what happened to us had to happen, and what missed us could not happen to us. God values everything. Thus what happened to us was a trial by God of us. Some used to be suspicious concerning our stand toward the present system as an opposition, to the

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point that some parties said that we support the present system by our opposition, and that between the system and us there was a gentleman's agreement. God, may he be glorified, meant to refute their suspicions.

Religious Incidents are False

[Question] You are accused by the government of being responsible for the recent religious incidents. What is your opinion?

[Answer] That is a lie because we were the pacifying factor during the incidents. During various religious incidents, the government used to resort to us...and we used to carry out our duty not for the government's sake, but because our religion recommends us to do so.... I tell you that the convention of Islamic groups was the most important factor, with the help of God "may he be glorified," in ending the incidents of "Al-Zawiyah Al-Hamra'." All people know that. People felt it even though officials denied it.... As for threats one day from here and one day from there, nobody will feel their weight but those who are threatening. Because not the weight of an atom can escape the eye of God, the most high, whether on earth or in Heaven.

[Question] There are diverse Islamic organizations which do not follow you. How do you look at them when they call everyone who does not belong to them a "sinner?" Is there any coordination among all of you?

[Answer] Whoever confesses the two creeds, follows them, and performs his religious duties is not a sinner, whether he belongs to an Islamic organization or not. At any rate, we regularly meet with their officials to make one work plan until our goal is achieved.

To Whom It May Concern

[Question] If you are asked to say a word to anyone who is interested, what would you say?

[Answer] I say that every official in this country knows well that we are the last people to conspire, plot, destroy, be sold, agitate, and provoke. In spite of this, the investigation and intelligence bureaus concentrate on the Muslim Brotherhood. Whoever believes we are not aware of it should correct his understanding.... We do not deceive anybody, at the same time no method did or will ever deceive us no matter how gentle or compassionate it might appear to us. I wish events would come to a head and close, confiscate, accuse, restrict and try us. I wish that would take place. This is the melting of pure gold in order to rid it of every impurity. We do not look forward to trouble...we ask God, may he be glorified, for well-being. But if that is inevitable, people should know that for those whom Qadhai and Assad could not alienate from their religion and struggle, neither a hurricane nor the rage of storms, nor darkness will prevent them from spreading their doctrine. "God hath purchased of the believers, their persons and their goods; For theirs (in return) Is the garden (of Paradise)." Surah al-Taubah; Section xiv: lll

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EGYPT

FORMER NASIRIST OFFICIAL IN EXILE CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 Oct 81 p 49

/Article: "An Egyptian Opposition Voice Calls for Dialogue: 'Abd-al-Majid Farid: Let Us Give Mubarak a Few Months"/

/Text/ 'Abd-al-Majid Farid, a leader of the Egyptian opposition abroad, who is currently devoting himself full time to administering the Center for Arab Studies in London, has an opinion on the latest new developments in Egypt. In summary, it is that the new Egyptian president must prepare to carry out a domestic reconciliation within Egypt. However, the time for such a reconciliation has perhaps not come.

We asked the man who worked for a long time alongside Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and still is faithful to his principles: "Through your knowledge of the symbols of Egyptian politics, do you believe that Husni Mubarak will continue with the political platform al-Sadat followed?"

He replied, "In principle, there is no one in the world who wholly resembles or approximates another person. If we accept this supposition, the answer to the question will be that Mubarak will not necessarily proceed with the same platform and style that al-Sadat relied on in his overall treatment of domestic and foreign political matters. It is true that Mubarak announced, right after al-Sadat's death, that he would continue with this policy and platform, but, in spite of that, I believe that it is still very early for the new Egyptian president to be putting his notions forth and crystallizing them in a specific direction, as far as foreign or domestic affairs are concerned."

/Question/ How is the opposition supposed to act while awaiting this crystallization?

/Answer/ My personal opinion is that we must wait awhile. Waiting will give the new president the opportunity to work quietly, because he will be judged by numerous foreign and domestic factors. Not a long time will pass before everything becomes clear. After that, it will be possible for all the detachments of the Egyptian opposition to determine their position on Mubarak's policies and practices on the domestic and foreign levels. However, I stress that there are basic points which will be the determining ones in this area, first among them Egypt's return



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to Arab ranks. Mubarak must find the way for such a return, because Egypt, by returning to the Arab nation, will find the appropriate solutions to its political and economic problems in a better and more honorable manner for itself and its history, instead of working apart from its Arab brothers.

Will It Allow It Or Not?

/Question/ But do you believe that the United States will allow a change in the course of Egyptian policy, especially since all evidence indicates the presence of a concentrated, influential American presence in Egypt following al-Sadat's departure?

/Answer/ Whether or not it will allow it will be one of the basic challenges facing Mubarak in the first period of his presidency, and he must find a solution to it in the light of Egypt's interests, which are linked to Arab interests generally. I know very well that the Americans consider Egypt one of the basic pillars for protecting their interests in the Middle East, principally the oil of the Gulf. All the American research and studies we have in the Center for Arab Studies show that American strategy in the Middle East up to al-Sadat's death was based on two foundations:

The strategic alliance with Israel.

A direct or indirect presence, with political and military weight in some countries in the area, in the form of military bases or joint facilities and maneuvers, specifically in Egypt, the Sudan and Turkey. The Americans' alliance with al-Sadat was essential to their strategy, as was their alliance with the late Shah of Iran as far as their interests in the Gulf went.

Continuing with his analysis of American strategy in the Middle East, he added, "Perhaps that explains the state of real panic that occurred in American political and military circles directly after al-Sadat's death, especially since the new American strategic plan in the region was in its final stages, after the period of review of its broad outlines had passed. If Egypt in the new era continues to pursue its former line, that will greatly ease things for the Americans. This explains their extreme emphasis on the new regime in Egypt these days. I wonder if the Americans will continue to rely on Egypt as in the previous period, now that it has become clear to them that the opposition in Egypt, with all its detachments, has teeth and fangs and has demonstrated its effective influence on the course of events."

In the course of the response he said, "It is necessary to spend a limited period of time which might not be more than a few months for these aspects to be fully clear."

The Killing Itself

/Question/ On the subject of the opposition, which detachment in it killed al-Sadat?

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/Ans 7 In the first place it was al-Sadat who killed himself. I would almost say that committed suicide. It is a saying that violence breeds violence. Al-Sadat, when he confronted the opposition with all its detachments, without distinguishing between right and left, Moslems and Copts, when he shut down all the newspapers and magazines that expressed differing opinions, detaining or transferring journalists and university professors from their places of work--when he did all this and much else besides, he was thus creating conditions and circumstances by himself from which what occurred lately in Egypt had to result, and because of which it occurred. That is, a confrontation of violence by violence, violence which reached the point of assassination. So he is totally responsible for killing himself.

/Question Personally are you in agreement with what has happened, that is, the assassination and liquidation of al-Sadat in the manner in which it happened?

/Answer In principle, I am not in agreement with the idea of assassination. Assassination in itself does not end anything. That is a style which violates the nature of the Egyptian people and it is a platform in Egypt which is new, except for some limited stages in Egyptian history. If we review all the acts of political assassination in Egypt, we will see that they occurred as a result of reaching a stage of "total repression of the expression of divergent opinions." Therefore I warn that continuing this style in the modern era will result in continued blowups and major incidents in Egypt. On this subject, I hope that the new regime will take this historic truth seriously, try to make a national reconciliation with the opposition, and put all Egypt's interests above all interests or connections. This is the only proper way to start a new stage in Egypt's history.

/Question Are you optimistic that there is a likelihood that the new regime will proceed to take such a step?

/Answer In any event, this type of step cannot be carried out in 24 hours. Let us take our time and wait.

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EGYPT

**TASK OF GETTING NATION TO RENOUNCE ISRAELI LINK REVIEWED**

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 Oct-5 Nov 81 pp 18, 19

/Article: "The 'Sinai Grace Period' Is the Problem--Egypt and the Arabs, between Subjective and Objective Factors"

/Text/ Since al-Sadat's assassination a few weeks ago, the question has arisen: will Egypt return to the Arab nation? The answers so far have been numerous, as have the bets. However, no Arab official has contacted the new Egyptian president to propose such a return, and the Egyptian president himself is waiting for the Arabs to come back to Egypt and not vice versa, because it is they who broke off relations with it. In this letter from Cairo, an attempt is made to interpret this "waiting" and its subjective and objective reasons. Independent judgment has it that the Fez summit will repeat the Baghdad conference's invitation to Husni Mubarak to put him seriously in contact with Arab solidarity.

After his return from the Egyptian president's funeral, Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister, surprised public opinion with a statement that set off a diplomatic bomb when he said "Now that al-Sadat is gone, a major obstacle that had been obstructing the restoration of Egyptian-Arab relations has been eliminated."

In spite of the violent criticisms that this statement met in America and Western Europe, as it was considered a diplomatically inelegant statement in these circles, Cheysson held to his position and continued to interpret it and justify it in accordance with his conviction that there would be no good in any efforts made for the sake of peace as long as Egypt was isolated from the Arab situation.

Cheysson's statement is correct, but it is seriously deficient because he has taken into consideration only the subjective factor, embodied in the person of al-Sadat, who until the moment before his assassination was continuing to bet on Israel against the Arabs, Palestine and Egypt's Arabhood, burning all bridges between his regime and the Arab nationalist position. At a time when he was praising "Begin's honesty and nobility," he was describing all the Arab rulers in the vilest terms principally imbecility. At the end, as an Arab prime minister said, he spared no one except President Numayri, President Siad Barre and Sultan Qabus.

Therefore, the continued rule or dominance of the stage by al-Sadat's personality ruled out from the beginning any attempts, however covert, to repair the bridges between Egypt and the rest of the Arab nation.

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In this context, Claude Cheysson's first reading was correct, as was his second reading on the impossibility of arriving at peace by isolating Egypt. The two readings are correct, but when one pauses before these two points their inner meaning collapses, and here Cheysson comes to appear as a person who is given as an example in the Arab situation of breaking up the facts by reading the verse of the holy Koran that says "Do not draw near to prayer," then stopping on purpose before the end of it--"while you are drunk."

## The Objective Side

Cheysson, in his reading, neglected the Camp David agreement, which is the objective side of the issue and is more important than the subjective one. In building Egyptian-Arab bridges, the Egyptian regime, which al-Sadat has departed from and which he left to his vice president, Husni Mubarak, basically comes up against the obstacle of Camp David. This obstacle has been aggravated by the detention of figures and leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, which is against the peace and normalization, because, while the issue of the detentions has an internal side, no one should ignore that it has an Arab nationalist side: no one can consider that Egyptian bridges could extend to the Arabs over the bodies and the freedoms of the domestic national movement.

From the moment al-Sadat vanished, the refrain of Egypt's return to Arab ranks has been repeated. That is a refrain that characterized by a concealment of and deliberate refusal to see Camp David. The American and European press has written that circles in the Arab league are studying the possibility of inviting Egypt to take part in the Fez summit to be held toward the end of November, and that the new Egyptian officials have agreed to take part in the conference on condition that it be postponed till next year. However, the secretariat general of the league hastened to deny the American and European press' notion and declared that no one had raised the idea of inviting the Egyptian regime to take part or of postponing the date for holding the conference.

Here the same refrain shifts to Rabat, in a new musical context. The American and European press has reiterated that King Hassan the Second is seriously working as a mediator to bring Egypt back to the league after a long absence, and that to that end he sent his premier Matti Bouabid to Cairo to be his representative at al-Sadat's funeral and to broach the plan with Husni Mubarak. However, the fact that Bouabid did not appear in the funeral procession cancelled this refrain as well.

Finally, the refrain in the American and European press shifted to Riyadh and took the form of a Saudi formulation on the multifaceted efforts that are covertly being made to restore Egyptian-Saudi relations to the state they were in before Camp David, as if nothing had happened! However, an official Saudi spokesman hastened to deny that any contact of that kind had been made.

Then came the role of Husni Mubarak, who, after he had assumed the presidency, announced that none of the "Arab friends" (note the use of the word "friends" instead of "brothers") had got in touch with him on resuming relations, and that he personally considered that the resumption of relations had to come about through the Arabs' initiative because they were the ones who had broken their relations

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with Egypt, as a result of their opposition to the Camp David policy. Mubarak also announced that he was loyal to this policy which the former president had drawn up and paid for with his life. He added that the restoration of relations with the Arab "friends" was in no event to be a substitute for peace and friendship with Israel.

Thus the objective fact governing the position in the region has become clearly crystallized: this is that the Camp David policy is what severed the relations between Egypt and the Arabs, is what prompted the Egyptian army to assassinate al-Sadat (one of the three engineers of Camp David), and lastly is what is standing as a stumbling block to the restoration of Egyptian-Arab relations to their natural course even though the subjective element in the rift has been eliminated.

## The Regime and the People

However, this fact, simple and central as it is, interacts, following al-Sadat's assassination, with a fact of extreme complexity. When the Arabs declared the rift with Egypt and suspension of Egypt's membership in the Arab League, following al-Sadat's rejection of the Baghdad conference offer, they were careful to make a distinction between the regime and the Arab people in Egypt. It is to be observed that this concern and distinction were most intense following the 35-second operation that ended al-Sadat's life, and the slogan "Glory to Arab Egypt and death to traitors" was raised.

This concern assumed an intense aspect, to the point where some Arab parties recorded a sort of despair over Egyptian popular movement against the regime and belittled the weight of the nationalist opposition with all its parties. These nationalist forces today are returning to the ranks of the Arab forces which have continued to be careful to distinguish between the regime and the people and to have confidence in the powers and the genuine nature of the people.

It appears, in following the course of events, that the new Egyptian president is basing himself on a policy of two contradictory lines--first, his declaration that he would continue with the policy of Camp David, the peace and the normalization of relations with Egypt, and second, a suspension of al-Sadat's attacks on the Arabs, some aspects of which were obscene, and the opening of a dialogue with some forces in the domestic opposition, in lieu of dealing with them through the agencies of repression and the well-known Law on Impropriety.

## Is the Opposition Plural?

Some observers note that the positions of the domestic opposition over the new president are starting to differ. The Socialist Labor Party, represented by its head, Ibrahim Shukri, declared conditional support for Husni Mubarak in the course of the referendum on the presidency, and after that a meeting between him and Husni Mubarak occurred. After this meeting Shukri declared, "The current circumstances in Egypt are delicate and sensitive," and said that he still opposed the Camp David agreements but supported President Husni Mubarak in confronting Israel, ending the policy of enmity toward the Arabs, and promising release of detained persons. He was eager to define some of the points on which he supported the new president's orientation.

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Wholly to the contrary, the National Progressive Unionist Grouping, after its emergency meeting chaired by Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, its secretary general, declared that Husni Mubarak's decision to proceed with the Camp David policy had compelled the grouping to vote "no" on his election as president. However, the party secretary went on, "Mubarak's press and television statements following the referendum on his steps, which were aimed at stopping attacks on the Arabs, rapidly ending the investigation into the detainees and releasing everyone whose guilt is not proved, are statements which contain a position that deserves support." Nonetheless, the new Egyptian president did not invite Khalid Muhyi-al-Din to meet him, and this indicates a clear attempt to fragment the ranks of the opposition and limit their cohesion in resisting the policy of Camp David and hostility to the Arabs.

Mumtaz Nassar, member of the People's Assembly and official spokesman for the national coalition, expressed his concern over this attempt and severely opposed the imposition of martial law following al-Sadat's assassination, saying "The issue in essence is not opposition to or support for a former president or a current one--it is the continued unity of the national coalition whose work has been proved by events. Perhaps Husni Mubarak had the right to be given time, but this in no way changes the basic program of the coalition, which is aimed at confronting Camp David, bringing Egypt back to its Arab and Palestinian cause, abrogating all laws restricting freedoms, bringing down the impoverishing 'liberalization' policy and immediately freeing all detainees unconditionally."

Reliable sources stress that the national coalition leaders, along with the leaders of the Grouping and Labor Parties, have begun to be active in this direction, in order to maintain the unity of the national movement, especially since it does not foresee that the new regime will be stable or endure if it continues al-Sadat's platform of clashing with the nationalist movement and its program.

It seems that there have been hidden contacts between the men of the regime and some opposition forces aimed at giving Mubarak a specific grace period for crystallizing his policy. The new president has requested that the opposition use its influence to obtain a corresponding grace period from the Arabs as well. His claim in this is that only less than 6 months remain until the date for the Israeli evacuation from Sinai; this specifically is the grace period he is requesting from the nationalist opposition forces domestically and from Arab forces, lest Israel be given a pretext not to evacuate. After that, the whole issue will be presented to the Egyptian people and the Arab nation, with the goal of determining a new policy.

#### An Attempt at Reconciliation

It has been noted that this request is receiving considerable support from some parties in the national forces. However, there is a fear that Husni Mubarak will probably seek recourse to formal concessions which will not affect the essence, during the transitional grace period, and thus will have gained time to undermine the ranks of the national forces and the Arab forces both.

Underlining this probability is the fact that al-Sadat's departure has actually placed Israel in a dilemma which of necessity will turn critical, and it finds

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itself faced today with two difficult options, even in the context of Camp David itself. The first is to evacuate the remaining portion of Sinai, in spite of the departure of al-Sadat, whose existence was considered a basic guarantee; this raises contradictions within the Israeli entity whose early signs started to appear with the refusal of settlers in the north of Sinai to evacuate their settlements except through armed force. The second is for Israel to refrain from evacuating, thus exposing itself as a racist colonialist power which cannot be dealt with because it evades its written undertakings and offers no hope for peace with any Arab country.

People who speak of these two options consider that the Israeli iron is hot today and that it is ready to strike, once again stressing that the Camp David group is not the force for peace but that the force for peace is the totality of Palestinian rights supported by an effective Arab solidarity that includes Egypt within the Arab family.

Observers expect that as this tendency grows the Arab summit in Fez will be aimed at reconciling the demand for a grace period with the strategy of united Arab action by repeating the Baghdad conference invitation that al-Sadat had rejected to Mubarak. While waiting for the invitation from Fez, and the response to this invitation, the question on Egypt and the Arabs after al-Sadat's departure is insistently being raised in all quarters.

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EGYPT

PROMINENT DISSIDENT ANALYZES DOMESTIC, ARAB CAUSES OF RIFT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 Oct-5 Nov 81 pp 22, 23

/Article: "Hikmat Abu Zayd to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: Al-Sadat's Assassination Is a Continuing Movement and There Are Arab Causes for Egypt's Isolation"

/Text/ Dr Hikmat Abu Zayd, a former Egyptian minister in the era of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, considers that the assassination of al-Sadat does not necessarily mean the assassination of the political system he implanted. She is convinced that the Palestinian segment of the Camp David agreements are a failure, that their economic gamble failed, and that Egyptian thinking, which is isolated in the Arab context, has begun to be characterized by chauvinism. This conversation with her is an attempt to convey a picture of one Nasirist party's interpretations of the Egyptian situation after al-Sadat.

/Question/ Could we learn about the movement you represent in Egyptian society, the role it is playing, and its political platform?

/Answer/ In reality, we are a mass movement that represents a large segment of the Egyptian people. This large segment is embodied by Nasirism, which has been more closely linked to the people and the masses than with the elite or a minority separate from the mass movement. Therefore it does not constitute a party in the restrictive sense of the word; rather, it constitutes a current, and this current in reality expresses the hopes and pains of the Egyptian people.

So far, from the standpoint of popular organization, this movement does not have a clear organizational context. However, we are working in the form of an agreement or specific intellectual context and in the context of the 23 July 1952 revolution, which the movement has not swerved from and cannot swerve from because it has not yet achieved its goals. The Sadatist apostasy has caused it to retrench and has in reality caused us to start roughly from zero in this matter.

Therefore we express on a broad scale a movement in every Egyptian village and town, and our concern is to be a "framework for political action"--organized action calling for a restoration of solidarity to Arab ranks, a resumption of work with the masses, and a restoration of commitment to the cause and the rights of the toiling class.

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/Question/ What is your position on the Egyptian regime under President Husani Mubarak? Is there scope for cooperation with this regime?

/Answer/ We consider the new Egyptian regime an extension of the policy al-Sadat drew up, which led Egypt into isolation from the Arab situation. The constant detentions that are taking place in the context of the Sadatist line mean that there has been no change in platform. In the face of this continuation of al-Sadat's regime, we can only say that we will continue to oppose and fight this regime in order to bring Egypt back to the national context and bring the Zionist flag over Cairo down. It is a stigma of disgrace that this flag is flying while part of Egypt is still occupied. How can you raise an enemy's flag and consider yourself free? How can you normalize relations when you are forced and compelled to normalize? It would be a hundred times better for Sinai to be occupied than for relations to be normalized in this fashion. Defeat here is not defeat--defeat lies rather in starting to negotiate while the enemy's troops are occupying one's territory.

The Minimum

/Question/ What is your contact with the Egyptian opposition domestically and abroad?

/Answer/ In reality, the channels of contact we are maintaining are with the nationalist movement abroad. This movement, which has broken off into different detachments, is on a minimal basis. This minimum with which we are working, even in the Egyptian National Front, entails bringing down al-Sadat's regime, restoring democracy to Egypt, and continuing the campaign against the Zionist presence and American colonialism in Egypt. Naturally there are contacts with the opposition domestically and we have not broken off continuous coordination with it.

/Question/ On what is your opposition to the Egyptian regime based? Is it restricted to domestic policies or does it include foreign policy as well?

/Answer/ We are opposed to Sadatist policies domestically and abroad. We opposed the policy of economic liberalization which al-Sadat drew up; since al-Sadat changed the economic systems and opened up to foreign investors, factories have no longer been built to use Egyptian manpower, but Egypt is a tremendous human resource; it is qualified.

To that we might add that foreign debts have started burdening Egypt. There is no self-sufficiency even as far as food goes. Then al-Sadat eliminated the role of the public sector and put it at the service of the private sector, transforming the labor movement from a productive force to a consuming force. The purpose in all this was to crush the economic foundation which is the basic pillar of the Nasirist political foundation. It was necessary to liquidate the public sector, inundate Egypt with debts, starve the Egyptian people and cut back educational services. In the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir, education was like water and air, as they say, and so was medicine.

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One of the results of the liberalization has been the emergence of a parasitic class consisting of 2 percent of the people which is the beneficiary and is applauding every plan of al-Sadat's. This class came into being to suck the blood and labors of the people.

This is our opinion on domestic policy, which we are against. We are against the existence of the party which rules politically and is trying to create new parties today. The formal opposition which al-Sadat's regime is establishing through Islamic law we are also against; we do not consider that it has arisen from the people.

We are also against the policy of holding referendums because that distorts the will of the Egyptian people. It is not reasonable to have 12 million people go to the polls to give a vote of "yes" or "no," agree themselves to imprison themselves in the prisons of the opposition and vote on security measures and national unity without knowing what these security measures are. In brief, we are opposed to the domestic policy and foreign policy al-Sadat has followed, which the new president, Husni Mubarak, will continue.

Egyptian Chauvinism

/Question/ What is the extent of the influence of Egyptian-Israeli relations on the Egyptian cultural identity?

/Answer/ This question gives us no rest. This part of the world, the Arab nation, is distinguished by geographical boundaries that make it an integrated unit and are actually propitious for cultural and geographic unity. There is unity among the people, because we go back in our roots to a single origin. There is also a social and cultural heritage which is based on the unity of language, the unity of culture and the unity of literary and scholarly output.

At the time Israel is carrying out a process of culturally fusing together all the dispossessed coming from all countries of the planet, from Poland, Eastern Europe, the whole West, and the Arab world, through the settlements, the Arab citizen is experiencing a rift in his culture. It wants to break up this integrated cultural legacy to keep us from achieving cultural unity.

History books in Egypt today omit everything that was and is written about hostility between Egypt and Israel, which plundered Palestine and is striving to transform Arab culture and turn historic enmity into friendship! Likewise, in the mosques, Koranic verses in which the Jews appear as an aggressive people, an enemy of God, who fought the prophet in all the settlements that existed in Medina and Yathrib, are prohibited.

In addition to that, there is the perversion of such senior men of letters as Najib Mahfuz and Tawfiq al-Hakim, by seducing them with scientific titles and money so that they will immerse themselves within the crucible in which they are fusing together the process of normalization.

They have also started to have a big influence on curricula. Zionist scholars have started to invade Egyptian universities with their conferences, in spite of

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resistance on the part of some university professors. Even the media have been mobilized in service of the Zionist orientation.

In addition to that, the boycott of Egyptian literature and Egyptian literary output has actually created chauvinism on the part of some Egyptian literary figures, as a consequence of their feeling isolated, and this has caused them to rush into the embrace of the Zionists.

They are trying to control the cultural channels that link Arab society to Egyptian society, and divert Egyptian sympathies and Arab nationalist sympathies into the channels of the Israeli intellectual invasion.

A Return to Baghdad

/Question/ Will al-Sadat's departure bring on Arab solidarity, especially since some observers expect a delay in the coming Arab summit, while waiting to learn what the developments in Egypt will lead to?

/Answer/ The question that is at issue today is whether there will be a retrenchment from Camp David and the normalization process. Will the Egyptian officials review their position on the resolutions adopted at the Baghdad conference? Yesterday al-Sadat rejected the Arab offer, and today Husni Mubarak is saying that we will never boycott the Arabs and they must make the first step. That means that he will not back down from Camp David and the treaty it is linked to. Are the Arab kings and presidents ready to accept Egypt while it is burdened down by such a treaty and such connections? This means opening the back door for Israel to infiltrate forcibly into the Arab nation.

There is another thing. Perhaps Husni Mubarak has wanted to "liberate" all of Sinai in its third stage--so should you wait until next April, or, as they say, until you become liberated and Egypt returns to Arab ranks? Personally I believe that the normalization process will continue after April. Israel today is at the stage of testing Husni Mubarak's intentions because it will be prepared to renege on its decision.

Therefore it seems as if the period is one of a testing of Mubarak's intentions in the Arab and Israeli contexts. He finds himself between two halves of the pincers. All the plans that have been put forth on the international stage are aimed at building political bridges between Israel and the Arabs and at the same time between the Arabs and Israel through Egypt.

Here we wonder whether the Arabs are sufficiently integrated and prepared to stand against the plans that will weigh them down. I consider that they are not able to stand as one man at the present time. There are many schisms in the Arab nation and that is the reason why the doors are being opened to numerous plans. The Arab nation is suffering from a lack of unity even in its political orientations. To that end I consider that the next summit conference could be postponed, because there is no concurrence of ideas on the projects that have been set forth or on a clear plan. Even oil is almost lacking in effectiveness, because the Arabs differ even on setting the price of oil and have removed it from the struggle.

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Why the Detentions?

/Question/ Why are the detentions going on in Egypt?

/Answer/ The detentions have involved more than 7,000 people so far. We realize that students are the stronghold of revolution and they started a big detention campaign shortly before the opening of the universities. The reason is that al-Sadat had the new list, a list of which he said "I have a list of young people and if they join the resistance movement I will detain them."

The campaign of detentions is proof of what? It is proof that the assassination of al-Sadat was not an isolated matter. It proves that the ruling Egyptian regime is totally remote from the people and developments among the people. It also proves that the struggle is not factional, as has been said, for today there are no acts of aggression in the factional context. History shows that Egypt has not known factional massacres or factional struggles; similarly, the Islamic religion respects temples and churches.

So we wonder why the detentions are going on today. The first detentions were on factional pretexts, but what are the purposes of the ones today? These detentions are proof that the movement which started with the assassination of al-Sadat is a ramified, interconnected one, a political movement in the first place, a national and domestic movement which is trying to correct the course which al-Sadat put us on 11 years ago.

We also wonder why the Asyut movement occurred after al-Sadat's assassination; it was because it really wanted the revolution to continue until Egypt was rid of the normalization of relations with the Zionist world, Egypt regained its Arab face, and the truth and matters were returned to their proper place as far as the liberalization policy went.

We must intensify the campaigns against the opposition, domestically and abroad. Even domestically people have started to be afraid of foreign opposition; why? Because it is turning the whole world's attention to what is going on with regard to the journalists; the men of ideas are all in prisons because they opposed al-Sadat's policy--they were not factionalists. Are the 67 journalists who were transferred from the media to other centers, headed by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, factionalists? The goal is to silence the Egyptian opposition and subject Egypt and the Arab nation to the service of Israel and America.

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EGYPT

STATUS OF PROMINENT FEMALE DETAINEE REVIEWED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 Oct-5 Nov 81 p 106

/Article by Salma Fakhri: "The 'Infernal' Nawwal al-Sa'dawi: Woman to Woman"/

/Text/ Nawwal al-Sa'dawi, the Egyptian doctor and writer, has been in prison since 6 September, as one of the thousands who were involved in the campaign of repression before al-Sadat's assassination. We have deemed it proper to go back to her latest book "Firdaws--a Voice from Hell" which was issued in French, and make a reflective critical pause before it.

The voice came from far off, bearing centuries of silence, a silence disrupted by sighing, then whispering, before it was transformed into a cry but remained concealed--crying though not even the ears of the person making the cry could hear it.

What is the fear or ignorance that made women keep silent, and still does? Their fear of men, father, brother, husband and son, of the persons who are at once guardians and oppressors, or their fear of the unknown?

Women in our world are even unaware that there is a world beyond "the world of the harem" which they come from. They are unaware that there is freedom beyond the prison walls. Vision is blocked and flying over horizons that are not mapped out for them is forbidden, even in dreams.

More oppressive of women than the men are the women themselves, in their undeclared solidarity against--women!

"Firdaws--a Voice from Hell" is the offspring, the offspring of talk, the talk of "Firdaws." In it, Nawwal al-Sa'dawi states in a loud voice, in the face of all women and men, all she wants to state. She speaks of the prostitute's rebellion on the eve of her execution for killing a pimp, after he had pushed her into sex with all the men who left their traces on her body. Her rebellion is in her choice to be a prostitute, ultimately, free and independent, rather than remain a woman deceived in marriage as in love, when the streets become her final refuge following one defeat after the other, from childhood in Upper Egypt, where her father preferred his cow to his wife and daughter, to adolescence in Cairo, where her uncle the professor refused to let her go to school "because there were men there" and hastened to marry her off to a tyrannical stingy old man to get rid of her after he had seduced her.

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Her flight from family oppression did not save her from the oppression of society. The men all turn into wolves in a world where "thievery is protection."

The voice of Firdaws is one that does not complain and does not give excuses, but accuses: it accuses the paternal, maternal, police, bureaucratic and political systems. She discovered that this system classifies all the women in it as prostitutes--of various prices: the female employee who sells her body cheaply, out of fear of unemployment, or the professional prostitute who "imposes" her price. Work in itself does not add honor to the person who has it in a society that is dominated by wretchedness.

In this passionate angry confession by one woman to another, the voice of Firdaws and the voice of Nawwal al-Sa'dawi become one and speak for all the silence of Arab women.

Nawwal al-Sa'Dawi

Nawwal al-Sa'dawi, an Egyptian doctor, was born in the village of Kafr Tahlah on the banks of the Nile.

She is the author of novels, short stories and scientific research which have been nourished by the experience she lived through as a doctor and woman, revealing and giving power to the face of Arab women.

Among Her Books

Scientific research: "Women and Sex," "Men and Sex," "Femininity Is the Basic Attribute," "Women and Psychological Struggle," and "The Naked Face of Arab Women."

Among the novels and short stories:

"Women at the Zero Point," "Two Women in One," "Death of the Last Man on Earth," "Children's Rounds," "The Death of His Former Excellency the Minister," and "She Was the Weaker One."

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IRAQ

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 240, 24 Sep 81 pp 24-25

[Interview with Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa'dun Hammadi by Florence Ra'd: "Continuation of the War is Better than a Truce Which Could Cause it to Re-explode"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Iraqi Foreign Minister Dr Sa'dun Hammadi is constantly attending meetings in the Arab and international decision-making capitals on five continents. It is difficult for a journalist to meet with him, except in a structured and time-limited news conference. A quiet diplomat who has gained the ability to think methodically from his academic life, and vast diplomatic experience from his political life, and who was an author and journalist before taking on his very important mission at this stage of Arab history. Our colleague Florence Ra'd interviewed him about the issues of the hour, concerning war, peace, oil and strategy.

[Question] What about the Iraqi-Iranian war, now that a year has past?

[Answer] The day the war began, we said that we wanted it to be short. If the other side prefers that it be prolonged, we are prepared for that. Clearly the Iraqi forces are still in the positions that they occupied during the first week of the war. What has occurred this year are futile attempts [to dislodge them] which has cost the Iranian side dearly.

With the war a year old, I do not think that Iran's situation is better than it was a year ago. This is well known and clear to everyone. In contrast to that, the Iraqi regime has established its position, power and capability, with increasing popular support. Also, the Iraqi economy has not been affected, as witnessed by the journalists, who have come from various parts of the world and have reported what they have seen.

On the international level, the curve of Iranian relations with the world is obviously on the downturn, because no one is convinced of the soundness of the Iranian position. However, the international commissions that were formed and which made their efforts in Baghdad and Teheran have not recorded any observations about the Iraqi position. Iraq's Arab and European relations, as well as its connections with the non-aligned nations and the Islamic Congress, are all excellent. If the mediation efforts have so far been unsuccessful, we must only be patient until a just peace is achieved. We don't want to achieve a temporary truce, returning later to war again. The continuation of the war is better than a truce which could cause it to re-explode.

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What is our concept of a just peace? We understand it to be guaranteeing Iraqi rights on land and in the Shatt al-Arab, and Arab rights regarding the three islands, as well as Iran's abandonment of the policy of hegemony in the Gulf region. It must refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the neighboring Arab countries, respect freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, and be observant of Arab security and international interests. Matters such as these deserve patience, and deserve more sacrifice on the way to a lasting peace.

Our Obligation and Others

[Question] After the incident of the prime minister's office, Iran threatened through one of its officials to obstruct navigation in the Straits of Hormuz. What do you say regarding this threat?

[Answer] There are two questions here. The first is that Iran has tried, since the war began, to use this weapon to frighten the world and to gain international intervention, in order to rescue its deteriorating military position. I believe that this attempt will continue as long as this collapse is increasing. Therefore, in our discussions with the mediators, we have been very anxious to have freedom of navigation and means of international communications be a part of any agreement reached, not only to protect Arab security, but also as a perception of ours of responsibility toward vital world interests.

The second question is our conviction that everyone in the world, whether nearby or far away, understands very well today that Iraq is making sacrifices--not just material but also human sacrifices, which cannot be equalled by any other sacrifice--on behalf of the interests of others. These others are not equal in recognizing this fact. We are defending Arab rights and Arab honor. We are fighting for Arab interests. We are not a member of any military alliance. We are not obligated to any international group. Our basic obligation is to use our armed forces when the independence and security of the Arab nations is exposed to danger. A day will come when everyone will stand up to their responsibilities, and the Arab world will understand that Iraq made sacrifices for interests that were broader than its own national interests.

[Question] What was the purpose of the recent battle of al-Khafajah?

[Answer] It was not the first battle in al-Khafajah. Last January, the Iranians attacked in this area, as well as Sarbil Zahab. I am not familiar with the military aspects from the technical, logistics point of view, but apparently the Iranian side thought that, through this area, they could begin a counterattack capable of developing into a comprehensive attack, leading to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the front that they occupy. Possibly, in their estimation, this area was the best one for such an attempt.

[Question] If peace is impossible, would the partition of Iran be the solution?

[Answer] If Iran persists in aggression against Iraq and in denying Iraq its rights, would Iraq be expected to care about Iran's unity? This is illogical. Under normal conditions, we seek the friendship of neighboring countries, for many reasons. We are neighbors, bound together by historic relationships. The reasonable man tries



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to live in peace with his neighbors, but what if your neighbor takes a hostile attitude toward you? In any event, the Iranian officials are persisting in their attack against us. Despite that, the opportunity is open to them to search for peace. If the cord of the search for peace is finally cut, and Iran does not recognize Iraqi rights, then we would not care about Iran's unity, particularly since there are internal movements demanding self-rule.

Non-Alingment

[Question] Next year Iraq will host the non-aligned conference. If it is still continuing, will the war force the postponement of this conference?

[Answer] We see no difficulty facing this matter. Everything is going as planned, and only Iran will not attend, despite the fact that we had hoped that it would attend. However, there is an Iranian precedent, which is its non-participation in the Islamic summit conference held in Ta'if. Iran's absence helped to make this conference a success.

I want to say that the non-aligned conference will be held, whether Iran attends or not, and it will be held as scheduled. We should note that Iran has not formed a new government as yet, apart from the fact that I have not found any text or evidence that Iran is suitable for membership in the non-aligned movement. What I do recall is a request from the government of Mehdi Barzagan for such a membership. At that time, Barzagan understood the movement and wanted to join. At that time, Iraq supported the request submitted by the Iranian government, but after Barzagan's removal, I no longer heard about any positive position coming out of Iran. All that I heard was negative, whether it was opposition to holding the conference in Baghdad, or encouraging the member nations not to attend. Iran is talking about "neither East nor West." I don't understand what that phrase means. We have not yet heard anything about the principles of non-alignment. All we hear are the many statements by the Iranian leaders and religious men talking frankly about the Iranian regime's "duty" to interfere in the affairs of other nations, such as Iraq, Bahrain or the Arab Gulf states. These statements, as well as the idea of exporting the revolution abroad, are hardly compatible with the principles of non-alignment. These are principles drawn up to prevent any kind of ideological or religious domination of one state by another.

[Question] What is your evaluation of Iraqi relations with the nations of the Arab West, following Tariq 'Aziz's trip to these countries?

[Answer] In general, they are excellent relations. The purpose of the trip was twofold: to make direct contact after a long period of personal separation, and secondly to consult about the question of Lebanon, the request to hold the Arab summit conference and the timing of that; the new Arab League charter; the present stage of the Arab-Israeli dispute; Arab relations with the new administrations in Paris and Washington, and finally, the problems of the Arabs themselves, whether in the West or the East.

Pan-Arab Consideration

[Question] How would you describe Iraqi-Tunisian relations?

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[Answer] They are developing in accordance with an ascending curve. I expect that they will continue to develop.

[Question] Do the Arabs reciprocate Iraq's pan-Arab commitments and sacrifices?

[Answer] The officials statements prove the extent of this response. The fact is that the fundamental Iraqi position is to stand beside the Arab states, i.e., an Arab state exposed to attack by a foreign state, irregardless of regimes or bilateral relations. It is a pan-Arab position that we are committed to, whether the others reciprocate or not, and we will continue on this path. We used to want the pan-Arab consideration to be the basis of the positions of all the Arab states.

When the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out, some Arab brothers took the neutral position regarding this war, by virtue of the fact that the Iranian revolution supported the Palestinian case. But after the crash of the Argentinian airplane, and after the use of Cyprus' Larnaca airport for the flights of several aircraft that transported arms between Israel and Iran, it became evident and was certainly proved that the Israeli enemy, was cooperating with the revolution that claims to be Islamic and demands the liberation of Jerusalem.

Iraq has explained the facts and has given everyone the documents. It is talking with everyone and relying upon their care and concern. We hope that some Arabs will change their positions. So far, the only Arab regime that cooperates with the Iranian regime, and which persists in this cooperation, is the Syrian regime. The important thing is the disclosure of the evident arms connection between the Iranian and Zionist regimes. This connection is most significant and is more important than any other consideration.

This disclosure has shed light on the truth of the great powers' allegations, especially the United States, that they want to see a quick end to the war, and that they have a neutral position with respect to Iran. We have confirmed that there is an arms connection between Iran and the Zionist enemy, whether it be equipment or spare parts that Iran has received through Israel. This equipment is American made, and the deal could not have been concluded without American approval. The question: Does the United States in fact want an end to the war?

Another observation that we want to make is that the Iranian regime makes the most fanatical claims, that we know of, of any regime with regard to Islamic principles, and the most fervent claims about caring for the Palestinian case. But the disclosure about its cooperation with Israel means that it is a regime that says one thing and then does the exact opposite. It uses religion as a cover for its political interests, and when its interests require that it violate the letter and spirit of the Islamic religion, it does not hesitate to do so. The Iranian regime works for its own self interests; other things are secondary in importance. In this matter, one would suppose that the Muslims and clergymen among them would especially recognize the truth. The regime that claims the most adherence to the principles of Islam is the one that is the most ready to cooperate even with the Zionist enemy that injures our honor, occupies our holy places and makes our people homeless. We have prepared a memorandum about the claims of the Iranian regime that we will distribute to all Arabs and give the widest dissemination possible.

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[Question] What does this memorandum contain?

[Answer] It does not contain all the information but does have the basic information about the arms cooperation between Iran and Israel, and contains irrefutable evidence about this relationship.

[Question] What does the PLO think about this matter, since it was the one that carried out a reconciliation mission between Khomeyni and the Iranian opposition?

[Answer] One supposes that you should direct this question to the PLO. We are awaiting clarification from it about this question. The important thing is that irrefutable proof exists. We are prepared to inform everyone about the information that we have. I do not believe that the PLO's position today regarding the Iranian regime is the same as it was previously.

[Question] What is your view regarding Lebanon's request to hold a special summit conference?

[Answer] We have been discussing this matter. It is essential for us to do something positive. If the intention is of itself just to hold a summit, then there is a summit in 2 months. The intervening period is not long. From our experience with Arab action, we think that it would be extremely difficult to hold two conferences close to one another. But if the intention is to advance the date of the next summit, we have no objection to that.

[Question] What is your position regarding the new American administration, after your recent contacts?

[Answer] I have not gone to the United States except to attend the Security Council session. We have nothing that would prevent us from meeting with the American officials, if they request that, but we will not meet with them secretly. As for our position regarding the American administration, based on the evidence that this administration is farther away from the Arab position than the previous administration, then it must be closer to the Zionist position. For that, we rely on President Reagan's position during the election campaign and the statements of officials regarding the settlements and Jerusalem, their position regarding the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, their position regarding the continual arming of Israel, and the smuggling of their arms to Iran through the Zionist entity. Note that this smuggling is in violation of American law.

In any case, the opportunity is still open to Washington, if it adopts a position of support for Arab rights, which the international community has endorsed on many occasions. Without this position, US.-Arab relations will not improve, and I expect that they will worsen. As for Iraq's relations with the United States, there is nothing new there. It is possible that they will get worse; it is also possible that they will improve. They are subject to America's position regarding the Palestinian question.

[Question] Will there be diplomatic relations in the foreseeable future?

[Answer] Now?...no. In the future, anything is possible.

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[Question] What is your view regarding Prince Fahd's initiative?

[Answer] Iraq is committed to summit resolutions. I think that this initiative will be discussed at the summit conference to be held in Rabat next November.

[Question] What was the object of the visit that Major 'Abd al-Salam Jalud made to Iraq?

[Answer] Major Jalud visited Iraq after the bombing of the nuclear reactor. We discussed bilateral relations, and some of the Arab issues. This visit was an opportunity to eliminate many of the misunderstandings.

[Question] Don't you think that flooding the international market with oil will help to prolong the Iraqi-Iranian war, since the super powers are filling up their oil storage areas, whether the war ends or not? Are the brother Arabs heedless of this?

[Answer] We have made it clear that increased production is not in the Arab's interests. We have tried to reach an agreement on pricing. In our dialogue, we have supported the wish for cooperation among the Arab nations on behalf of a unified position, taking into consideration the basic Arab interests and the responsible international position with respect to the interests of the oil-consuming nations, especially the small nations.

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IRAQ

OIL MINISTER DISCUSSED POLICY, OPEC

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 238, 4-10 Sep 81 p 55

[Interview with Iraqi Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, by Ahmad Hafiz: "Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: "Iraq Has Not Sold a Drop of Its Oil on the Black Market"; date and place not specified]

[Text] When the OPEC sessions in Geneva ended in nothing, Iraqi Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim was perhaps the most affected because he had exerted extraordinary efforts to achieve a compromise that would preserve the organization's unity and cohesiveness if not its very existence. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI held a dialogue on oil matters with him.

[Question] It is only natural that the war should have had effects on all aspects of life in the country fighting this war. What effects has the war had in the Iraqi oil sector?

[Answer] It is no secret that the political leadership in Iraq anticipated the war before it broke out between us and Iran. All the events and circumstances which preceded the war warned of its occurrence, and these circumstances were well known to everyone. But what I want to emphasize is that with regard to petroleum--and Iraq is in the vanguard of the petroleum exporting states--we took into consideration all the possibilities in case of the outbreak of war. Therefore, we were not surprised by all the developments which occurred subsequently.

[Question] But hasn't the war affected the rate of production and exportation of Iraqi petroleum?

[Answer] Most assuredly. It is unreasonable that production and exportation levels should remain unchanged after the country has been transformed from peace to war.

Production Must Continue

[Question] Let's deal with the question of production first. It is known that Iraq has producing around 2 million barrels per day before the war. What is the current production figure?

[Answer] Naturally, the figure has declined, but not by much. Allow me to assert that specifying the current figure is not the important thing. What is important

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is that production continue and not stop just as the other industrial plants and factories in Iraq are continuing production. For all states that are experiencing a state of war, the important problem becomes to continue the production cycle. Continuation is the most important thing and coming to a standstill is the greatest danger. As for the levels at which production continues, they must inevitably fall off. But this is a commonplace occurrence throughout the world.

[Question] What about exportation?

[Answer] Naturally, Iraqi oil exports have declined since the beginning of the war. However, the amount that we have been exporting has begun to grow steadily in recent months compared to the first months of the war. In any case, we have not stopped exporting Iraqi oil abroad since the war began.

We Have Begun To Implement Alternatives

[Question] After the attack on the port of Basrah by Iranian planes and the difficulties encountered in exporting Iraqi petroleum via the Gulf, what are the alternatives?

[Answer] Currently, Iraqi oil is being exported via the pipeline between Kirkuk . Baniyas on the Syrian coast as well as through the other pipeline that extends from the Iraqi oil fields to the Turkish coast.

[Question] Are these two pipelines sufficient to export quantities of Iraqi oil?

[Answer] No, they are not sufficient. For this reason, we have completed a study for two new projects involving the construction of two additional pipelines. The first will extend from the oil fields in Iraqi territory to the Jordanian port of 'Aqabah on the Red Sea, a total distance of 1,300 kilometers. With this pipeline, Iraq will for the first time gain an outlet to the Red Sea through which it can export its oil. The second pipeline will extend from Iraq through Kuwait and finally to the Red Sea in Saudi territory--near Yanbu', to be exact. The capacity of this pipeline will be around 1 million barrels per day, or 50 million tons of oil a year. With these projects, Iraq will have access to both the Mediterranean (Syria and Turkey) and the Red Sea (Jordan and Saudi Arabia).

[Question] When will work on these two projects begin?

[Answer] Very soon. We have already completed the studies and bids will soon be invited from international companies on the projects.

[Question] Let's get back to OPEC, its problems, and the disagreements of its members in the recent conference. What does OPEC represent to you in Iraq?

[Answer] It represents a very important organization to every member state in the organization. It protects the rights of the producer states against the exploitation and harassment of the big industrialized states that consume this vital resource, which is the main pillar of industrialization and even life itself in all states of the world without exception. We in Iraq believe that the continued operation of this organization is a strategic goal of far-reaching importance. It is incumbent upon

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the member states in this organization to overcome the peripheral disagreements in which each state seeks to achieve its own temporary interests. Because if these disagreements continue to worsen, the organization will be threatened with extinction. Then the agreement that binds the exporting states will be dissolved and the industrialized states will single out each state individually and impose on it whatever terms they please. Chaos will reign throughout the world oil market and there will come to be strong petroleum states that sell their oil for much higher prices than other states which may not be able to find anyone to buy their oil. This will have a negative impact on the rates of economic and social development in the oil-producing OPEC member states, all of which are members of the developing Third World states.

## Nature of the Disagreements

[Question] Do you believe that the disagreements among the OPEC states are economic or political?

[Answer] Both economic and political. Each state wants to achieve its economic interests through production levels based on the nature of the oil reserves stored under its land area. It also seeks to achieve the price that will bring it the greatest amount of profit to confront development problems and meet its daily subsistence needs. There are states for which oil does not represent the sole source of income. There are some OPEC member states that have small populations and others that have large populations, such as Indonesia, Nigeria, Algeria, and others. All of these are factors in the decision-making processes involving each state individually. The OPEC states are united by one characteristic only: they all belong among the developing states of the world. Aside from this, each state has its own problems, circumstances, and nature.

This is from the economic standpoint. From the political standpoint, each state also has its own political courses and ties which may differ considerably or very little from those of the other member states in the single organization OPEC. For this reason, disagreements among the OPEC member states are a natural phenomenon. However, at the same time, these states should not permit the disagreements to tear them apart. This could bring about the collapse of the organization that was established fundamentally to protect their rights collectively in confronting a united opponent, the industrialized consumer states. A solution--a compromise-- can ultimately be reached for every disagreement. Perhaps this is what caused us to do everything we could to arrive at that compromise in our recent OPEC meetings in Geneva. In an organization such as OPEC in which decisions are made unanimously, there must be a compromise agreed on by all states. There is no room for singlehanded action or for a state or group of states to dominate the rest of the member states.

[Question] But don't you feel that the developing consumer states have suffered considerably from the continuous and regular increases in oil prices?

[Answer] One of the positive aspects of OPEC is that it has taken this into consideration. This issue has been debated and an agreement has been reached that sets the economic aid which OPEC will pay to the importing developing states. This aid ranges between 3 and 5 percent of its oil revenues in the industrialized world. This percentage, which appears small, represents a huge sum. I recall that the figure in 1976 was \$1.5 billion. There is a proposal that was submitted by Iraq--

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as a matter of fact, it was proposed by President Saddam Husayn personally--calling for the establishment of a "world fund" to compensate the losses of the developing states due to oil price increases. This proposal was accepted in concept and in content, and we hope that final agreement will be reached on it soon. The petroleum exporting countries cannot sell their petroleum at two prices: one for the rich industrialized states and the other for the poor developing states. Therefore, the only solution that remains is through aid offered by the petroleum states and also aid from the rich industrialized states to the poor developing states. However, the industrialized states offer only three-tenths of a percent of their tremendous annual income from industry and economic activity.

The Iraqi Solution

[Question] What in your opinion is the most important issue that the OPEC states must reach agreement on whatever the nature of the difference that govern their relations?

[Answer] Agreement on a long-range price policy along with specification of the production levels in every petroleum state individually. This policy must allow for rates of inflation and growth in the industrialized states as well as declines or gains in the dollar, because the dollar is the accounting currency on the basis of which the OPEC states sell their petroleum--and because of its recent oil importance. You should realize that the OPEC states' losses due to declines in the dollar have amounted to \$242 billion from 1974 until the present. Moreover, there is another fact that many people may not know, namely, that in spite of the recent gain in the value of the dollar, its purchasing power is still less than it was in 1973.

[Question] To what extent does Iraq appear to be ready to discuss these issues with OPEC?

[Answer] We are completely ready to present everything necessary in order to enable the organization to continue performing its role. We believe that discussion of the issues I have mentioned is of considerable importance. Iraq views these issues as among the most important and vital issues for which the member states of the organization must arrive at radical and long-term solutions. It is sufficient to say here that Iraq is in the vanguard of the Opec states that adhere to all decisions of the collective organization. We have never sold a single drop of our oil on the black market, that market which has caused so many complications in world oil markets and prices.

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